According to the Marxian paradigm,5 ethnic identity is a form of false consciousness that disappears with the emergence of certain economic forces. Economic interests preempt ethnic identifications, and class mobilization obliterates ethnic divisions. Classes are the main actors in social transformations, with ethnic groups being configured only in relation to class categories and formations (ibid.: 10, 14). The Marxian paradigm does not emphasize internal class distinctions because these "take place under the imprint of purely national conditions and therefore lack those universal properties that characterize class struggle" (Parkin 1979: 29-30 ). This dominance of class over ethnicity in the analysis of social transformations originated in Karl Marx's writings. Marx maintained that capitalism would eradicate all communal elements, including ethnicity, which interfered with the formation of class consciousness.6 His subsequent analyses of class relations therefore assumed cultural and ethnic homogeneity in the societies he studied. Still, Marx was aware of the distinctions that existed within classes.7 Lenin, following Marx, identified segments within classes, namely, labor aristocracies, cadres, and vanguards; yet these segments were again assumed to be ethnically homogeneous.8 Rosa Luxemburg, one of the first social thinkers to note that people resisted ethnic forms of oppression with more intensity and violence than they did class exploitation, nevertheless believed that ethnic conflicts lacked the capacity to bring about social transformation (Luxemburg 1976 (Luxemburg [1908 : 96-97). Early Marxist formulations downplayed the role of ethnic conflicts in structuring revolutions and their outcomes. Observing the realities of a Europe becoming industrialized, they emphasized instead the transformative capacity of social classes. Max Weber's assessment of ethnic groups was similarly inadequate. He excluded the concept of ethnicity from the realm of objectivity and rationality by emphasizing its "subjective" nature and consequently defined ethnic groups as "those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or customs or both or because of memories of colonization and migration" (Weber 1968 (Weber [1956 ). For him, ethnic identity flourished only in the absence of rationally regulated action; as such, it was bound to be eradicated by industrialization and the modern bureaucratic state.9 In explaining social transformations, classical social theory thus emphasized the transformative capacity of classes and bureaucratic rationality, failing to anticipate the capacity of ethnic conflict to bring about social transformation.
The persistence of ethnic groups in industrial societies and their mobilization against the state have necessitated a new interpretation, however.'0 Some have argued, for example, that nationalism in late eighteenth-century Europe was embedded in an ethnic revival, an ideological movement for identity, autonomy, and cohesion (Smith 1979 (Smith , 1981 .11 Others have demonstrated how European industrialization also failed to replace intra-ethnic modes of interaction with intraclass modes (Hechter 1975 (Hechter , 1976 Hechter and Levi 1978) ; instead, existing political divisions within classes were translated into economic ones. The unequal distribution of power across ethnic groups in Europe thus resulted in a cultural division of labor, with some groups controlling the state administration and its resources to the exclusion of others.'2 9. When contrasting the Greek city-state with Rome, Weber (1968 Weber ( [1956 : 391) pointed out that "the low level of rationalization of Greek political life" had created ethnic fictions, which did not exist in Rome, where "rational organization was more widespread." 10. In contemporary societies, ethnicity and class intersect to redefine both concepts. Divisions within and among classes occur as the ethnic factor combines with particular political and/or economic conditions; specifically, nationalism and industrialization interact with ethnicity to divide classes along ethnic lines. These divisions are often referred to as intra-class situations, class fractions, and class segments (Zeitlin 1984) . 11. Anthony Smith (1981: 383) states that "in the early nineteenth century, scholars, poets and priests, and later journalists among these (European) populations began to convince the wider strata that the population who spoke these dialects and possessed these customs and antecedents constituted an 'ethnic community' because they possessed a common origin, history, and culture; and hence that they belonged together in virtue of their common roots in time and place. Later they began to define their communities as 'nations,' i.e., ethnic communities who also possess, or should possess, a common territory with geographical mobility throughout, a common self-contained economic system, and the common political rights of citizenship." 12. These reinterpretations of ethnicity and class have produced the concepts of "middleman minorities" and "labor-market segmentation." Middleman minorities refer to ethnic groups specifically involved in the movement of goods and services in a society (Turner and Bonacich 1980: 146; Bonacich 1980: 215; Boswell 1986: 354) . The differentiation of labor costs along ethnic lines produces labor-market The intersections between ethnicity and class reveal the historicity and contextuality of the concept of ethnicity and ethnic groups. This article redefines ethnicity along these lines as ethnic segmentation. Ethnic segmentation delineates the process through which ethnic groups differentially acquire rules and resources from the existing conflation of class and ideology. These groups construct (or reconstruct) their "ethnic" character when faced with the forces of industrialization and nationalism. They internally identify and become conscious of a set of common characteristics distinguishing them from those promoted by industrialization and nationalism. They also interact with other groups going through the same process and negotiate the boundaries which separate them from others. The boundaries of this construction and reconstruction are set by structural and cultural parameters.
This paper empirically studies ethnic segmentation in a non-Western society, the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, thus complementing prior research on ethnicity, which has been based almost exclusively on the experience of contemporary, Western industrial societies (Edwards, Reich, and Gordon 1975; Hechter 1976; Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982; Boswell 1986) . Focusing on the role played by ethnicity in the Ottoman social transformation from an empire in the nineteenth century to a number of nation-states in the twentieth, I argue that Ottoman ethnic segmentation, polarized by Western education and cultural translation, produced this political outcome.
Ottoman Ethnic Segmentation
Prior studies of the nineteenth-century Ottoman transformation have focused on the natural transformative capacity of external pressures on the empire (Heyd 1961; Berkes 1964; Polk and Chambers 1966; Inalcik 1972 Inalcik , 1980 Naff and Owen 1977; Wallerstein 1983) .13 Those scholars who, within a larger framework, have focused instead on the "internal dynamics" of empires (Moore 1967; Skocpol 1979 Skocpol , 1982 attribute their demise to the conflicts which developed among economic groups, specifically the peasantry, landlords, and state elites; they overlook ethnic divisions. In the Ottoman context, some scholars segmentation, in which class conflict between capital and labor translates into a market conflict between dominant and minority workers as employers replace higher-paid dominant labor with lower-paid minority labor (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982 ; Boswell 1986; Wachtel 1975 : 106-7; Edwards, Reich, and Gordon 1975). 13. A thorough critique of the assumed relationship between Westernization and subsequent social change is given in my dissertation (G6oek 1988), where I argue that internal dynamics, in addition to the much discussed external pressures, produced the Ottoman social transformation as a result of Western contact. (Karal 1982; Findley 1989) have downplayed the role of ethnic groups in the Ottoman social transformation by arguing that historical conjuncture (namely, the many wars and rebellions that occurred during the nineteenth century) accounted for the inability of the Ottoman state to incorporate ethnic groups into its polity. I argue instead that ethnic segmentation determined the structure of the Ottoman social transformation and, in the nineteenth century, further polarized existing social divisions to render such political unity impossible.
Ottoman society was stratified into two groups: the sultan and his administrators formed one group, the rulers, while the rest of society constituted the other group, the subjects. The rulers comprised all of those who were directly employed in the sultan's administrative service, all military groups, religious officers, and bureaucrats, as well as their families, other relatives/dependents, and slaves. All those who had no office in the sultan's service were subjects. Hence a political condition, the delegation of the sultan's authority, was responsible for social stratification. This was accompanied by another condition, namely, religion. In general, being a Muslim was a fixed requirement for entry to the ranks of the rulers and to the highest echelons of the social system.14
The Construction of Religious Communities
In the Ottoman context, religion demarcated ethnic groups and defined these as religious communities. The acknowledged rationale for this demarcation principle was the Koranic (49:13) statement that God had created and divided humans into "tribes" and "communities" so that they might be better able to recognize each other and so that no human being would be considered superior to another. Christians and Jews were considered to be, like Muslims, "People of the Book"; they had all received divine grace and guidance through the scriptures and the prophets. These people therefore had to be granted protection as religious communities within the Islamic state and the community of Islamic believers.
Yet religion in the Ottoman Empire also intersected with cultural, historical, and linguistic elements to redefine these communities as minorities (vis-a-vis the Ottoman state) and as ethnic groups (with respect to their historical experience and common culture).15 Religious 14. There were a few instances where non-Muslims rose to high posts, particularly those to do with finance, but these were exceptions. There were usually two channels available for the ruled to join the ranks of the rulers: demonstrating outstanding skills, and forming alliances with ruler households through marriage. 15. Ethnic differences among the Muslims, such as those of the Arabs, Circassians, and Turks, did not affect the relative position of these groups within Ottoman society. The Koran did not allow ethnic loyalty to supersede Muslim/religious loyalty. The polarization of these Muslim ethnic groups occurred later, only after demarcation had produced the separate communities of Christians, comprising subgroups of Catholics and non-Catholics (i.e., the Orthodox), and Jews. Historically, the identification of Ottoman religious communities as minority groups preceded their identification as ethnic groups; the Ottoman state had to define the position of such groups in Ottoman society as early as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. These centuries marked the initial social construction of the Ottoman state, as its rulers and administrators defined the social structure and worldview of the "Ottoman Empire." The delineation of the social and economic position of religious communities featured centrally in this construction process. The Ottoman state defined itself through its economic and social systems in general and its system of taxation in particular. As the Ottoman state organized the Greeks, Armenians, and Jews around their own patriarchates and rabbinate (respectively) in Constantinople, the character of the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish communities was transformed. Even though the law granted them freedom in terms of personal status and religious practice, the state's prohibiting them from performing public services "created two societies, side by side, with unequal rights" (Karal 1982: 387) .
From Religious Communities to Ethnic Groups
The transformation of these Ottoman religious communities into "ethnic groups," which segmented them and endowed them with a transformative potential, occurred in the nineteenth century. Two factors combined to produce this transformation: (1) the reproduction of existing Ottoman structural and cultural divisions, and (2) increasing Ottoman contact with the West. The Ottoman ethnic groups reproduced themselves in terms of their distinctive cultural manifestations, their collective sense of history, and their shared expectations of the future.
The Ottoman demarcation of religious communities, which was based on Islamic principles, translated into social practice as these communities endured and reproduced themselves within Ottoman society. In the process of reproduction, the members of each community acquired a cognitive sense of their difference in relation to the other communities and to the Muslims (thus perceiving themselves, and being perceived, as a minority group). This cognitive selfrecognition intersected with certain cultural, historical, and linguistic elements as the Ottoman state formulated rules and restrictions pertaining to these religious communities, thus providing religious communities with the properties of an ethnic group.
The rules and restrictions which separated religious minorities from The Ottoman state gave the minorities administrative autonomy in the execution of spiritual and certain administrative and judicial matters. The sultan only intervened to approve the religious leader elected by the community17 and to help enforce community decisions when necessary. An internal government, guided by this religious leader and assisted by a council composed of clerics and lay members, oversaw discipline in the religious sphere. In the administrative sphere, this body controlled education, churches, and cemeteries. In the judicial sphere, it regulated the execution of dowry obligations, marriages, and divorces as well as arbitrating alimony cases, civil rights issues, and often testamentary dispositions. This administrative autonomy of the religious communities also reinforced their status as separate social groups.
16. Minority leaders had some punitive power over their communities; they also officiated over divorces and marriages, although neighborhood Muslim judges could perform these legal/ceremonial functions for the minorities as well. 17. Upon approval, these leaders acquired a right of audience with the sultan, thus gaining access to his dispensation of justice.
These structural divisions had very significant cultural repercussions in Ottoman society. The sumptuary, legal, spatial, and administrative restrictions confined the social interactions between Muslims and minorities to professional and economic activities. The minorities interacted with Muslim residents at the marketplace and in shops and inns, but other centers of social life, such as mosques, bathhouses, and often coffeehouses, were closed to them. These restrictions prevented the Ottoman minorities from developing social ties that extended beyond their communities, limiting them to relationships only with other minority groups or with their Western coreligionists in the empire.
The Ottoman minorities had access to most of the empire's economic resources, but were restricted when it came to acquiring social resources. They owned urban property and participated in business and commerce equally with the Muslims, but they could not marry Muslims or, as was mentioned earlier, inherit property or other possessions from them. The practice of one group's maximizing its resources at the expense of another is termed "social closure" (Weber 1968 (Weber [1956 
Minorities comprised approximately 45 percent of the total population of Istanbul in 1885 (Eryilmaz 1990: 85).
There is no doubt that those who die among you in such an endeavor will reach heaven and those you kill will go to hell" (ibid.: I-XII/113). Some other Muslims went to the residence of the Ottoman governor, where they insulted him by calling him a "Christian" and a "Jew" and by spitting at him (ibid.: I-XII/129). Similar incidents had also occurred earlier when Mahmud II initiated Westernizing reforms. Once, when Mahmud II was riding on horseback in Istanbul, a man had grabbed his horse's reins and shouted, "You infidel sultan! God will come after you for this infidelity. You are destroying Islam and bringing all of us under the wrath of Prophet Muhammad!" (Ahmed Rasim 1987 Rasim [1924 : 162). Antagonism between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities continued to escalate throughout the empire during this period (Maoz 1982) .20
Such incidents revealed how the cognitive maps of all Ottomans contained ethnic parameters which were difficult to overcome. These difficulties persisted throughout the nineteenth century, as when, for example, long after the reforms had been initiated, an educated reformist Muslim still used social-segmentation categories in describing his father. He stated that his father "had such an attachment to his religion from the heart and respected it to such a degree that he looked upon people of other religions, if not as evil, as inferior. ... He always separated those religious communities from the Muslims" (Ali Kemal 1985 Kemal [1913 : 14).
Why was it impossible for the Ottoman state to effectively eliminate the Muslim/minority division and create a unified Ottoman polity? Ethnic segmentation became polarized in the nineteenth century through two intervening variables, one structural and the other cultural. Structurally, the very institutions introduced to reform and reproduce the empire, namely, the Western-style schools, further segmented Ottoman society, as the Muslims were educated in state schools and the minorities in foreign and minority schools. Culturally, the interaction of the Ottoman Muslims and minorities with the West created a cultural translation in which ethnic segmentation became reinterpreted along disparate parameters. While the Ottoman Muslims attempted to apply Enlightenment ideas to the processes of state reformation, most Ottoman minorities used those same ideas to transform their communal identities into broader systems. These disparate structural and cultural components thus suggested very different modes of political action, ranging from reform to rebellion. 20. Tensions within the religious communities also increased as a consequence of these reforms since the religious hierarchy had to accommodate the participation of their members in governance (Maoz 1982; Ortayli 1983 : 83).
The Reproduction of Ethnic Segmentation: Western Education
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, education was the main structural framework within which Ottoman ethnic segmentation became polarized. Western-style education in the Ottoman Empire was bifurcated to reflect this segmentation: two sets of educational institutions came into being, one established by the Ottoman state and the other by the Ottoman minorities and the Western powers. It was this structural bifurcation which reinforced Ottoman ethnic divisions and prevented the formation of a unified educational system that could have produced, in principle and religious differences notwithstanding, an educated "Ottoman" subject. Instead, the Muslim and nonMuslim students educated in these different institutions interpreted and applied their acquired knowledge differently, separately seeking solutions to the common problematic of the future direction of Ottoman social transformation. palace. This competition became intense in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Hence, one could argue that this internal political competition, in addition to the increasing military pressure from the West, induced the Ottoman sultan to introduce Western-style education into Ottoman society. In theory, the sultan could have replicated the success of his palace training in these Western-style schools by creating a body of officials who, trained at his schools, owed their allegiance to his person. To foster this loyalty, he recruited the top graduates of the new Western-style schools into his palace retinue (Mardin 1983: 58) .
Ottoman sultans first applied Western-style education in the eighteenth century to the training of military officers, later expanding the scope of application to cover the entire Ottoman educational system by the end of the nineteenth century. The establishment of the naval (1776) and army (1793) engineering schools was followed by that of the medical school (1826), a school specifically for surgeons (1831), and another school for military sciences. The original instructors for these schools were recruited from throughout Europe, especially from France and Scotland, with these instructors later being gradually replaced by their Ottoman students. Once the sultan's original Westernstyle military schools began to be followed by others, the number of different types of Western-style schools in the empire grew rapidly, especially in the mid-nineteenth century (G6oek 1988).
Training Ottoman bureaucrats on the Western model commenced with the founding of the Bureau of Translation and continued with the establishment of a law school in 1838. The curricula of many primary and secondary schools were then restructured to prepare candidates for this new, Western-style higher education. After 1827, the sultan sent large numbers of Ottoman students to the West, particularly to France. In 1856, forty-six students were dispatched to Paris and a school was established for them there the following year. The mounting expenses of this school, in contrast to the success and economy of the Western-style schools established in the Ottoman Empire,24 led to its being closed in 1864. Nevertheless, the French model imprinted itself on Westernized Ottoman education as more and more state schools were founded throughout the empire. This school was founded in the wake of the 1856 Imperial Reform Edict, which conferred upon Ottoman minorities legal rights to education in the Western-style Ottoman schools and to posts in the Ottoman government.26 In order to fulfill this legal commitment to the Ottoman minorities, the sultan sent a substantial number of minority representatives to the Ottoman school in Paris. Twenty-four of the ninety-four students (25 percent) educated at the school between 1857 and 1864 were members of Ottoman minorities: eleven were of Greek origin, nine were Armenians, and four were Bulgarians. Yet few of these minorities were able to secure Ottoman administrative posts upon their graduation. Of the thirty-five minority graduates whose occupations are known, only four (11 percent) joined the Ottoman government. Nor was there an increase in the number of minority students in the empire's Western-style schools. The Ottoman structural division between Muslims and minorities (ensuing from social closure) inhibited the participation of minorities in the sultan's new educational and administrative system (Findley 1980 (Findley , 1989 .27 Instead, the Ottoman minorities were educated in their own schools or in the foreign schools that were established in the empire.
Information concerning the modes of education for Ottoman minorities prior to the advent of Western contact is very sparse, coming mainly from accounts given by the few members of minorities who rose to high positions within the Ottoman administration and re-25. Although many efforts were made to incorporate minorities in the administration of the empire through their election to local advisory councils and their appointment as local or central administrators, these attempts remained the exceptions to the rule (Davison 1954 ). 26. The sultan attempted to incorporate minorities into Ottoman society through the Imperial Reform Edicts of 1839 and 1856, by which he demonstrated his acceptance of the principle of security for the lives, honor, and property of all his subjects (Inalcik 1964: 56) . Minority participation in the Ottoman social system and minority representation changed from a corporate basis to an individual one with the first Ottoman constitution, enacted in 1876. 27. There certainly were attempts to incorporate minorities into the Ottoman educational and administrative systems, and a number of these were successful; quite a few instructors and administrators were eventually recruited from among minorities-but this practice did not develop into a structural pattern. the Austrians and Italians voiced their own interests in the Catholics and the Uniates. The British, not to be outdone, expressed their concern for the welfare of all Ottoman minorities. In the course of the nineteenth century, these powers all asked for, and obtained, the right to improve the position of the "protected" minority communities, to intervene when necessary, and to open schools in which the languages of the "protecting" Western powers would be taught.
The Western-style education of the Ottoman minorities, provided both by their own communities and by Western powers, proceeded at a much faster pace than that of the Ottoman Muslims (Issawi 1982: 277) . In 1896, for instance, within the Ottoman domains, 83,000 (predominantly non-Muslim) students were being educated in the foreign and minority middle schools, while the comparable sultan's schools were providing an education for only 31,000 students; moreover, 19,000 students were attending foreign and minority high schools that year, when only 5,000 were enrolled in the sultan's schools. (of Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria) 50, Austria and Germany 32, and Italy 25 schools.32 The number of minority group members educated in these foreign schools increased throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
However, even with an education, the minorities were not readily incorporated into the Ottoman polity.33 Ethnic segmentation persisted, and patronage practices in the Ottoman bureaucracy favored the Muslims. Some minorities were dismissed due to "special circumstances," which sometimes meant (when the records were explicit) that their contacts with foreigners would "entail difficulties in confidential matters" (Findley 1982: 354) . Their salary entitlements and access to other monetary gains remained limited, and there was some reluctance to promote them to higher office: for instance, at the time of the appointment of the first non-Muslim minister, Ottoman statesman Fuad Pasa told the British ambassador that "some positions, including ministries of war and foreign affairs, and the grand vezirate would have to remain in Muslim hands" (Findley 1980: 206-9) . By the late nineteenth century, almost all of the Ottoman governmental agencies had reduced their minority representation, and the marginal position of the minorities persisted (Findley 1989: 113, 269) . Although the minorities were eager to participate as delegates in the first Ottoman assembly (Karal 1982: 397) and even voted for the elimination of all references to religious differentiation and for replacing these with the term "Ottoman," the parliament could not survive the strains of war. Why was it that Western education not only failed to overcome ethnic segmentation, but ended up structurally reproducing it? It was the cultural translation of Western, Muslim, and minority meaning structures within the Ottoman society at large, and particularly within the Western-style educational system, that reinforced ethnic segmentation.
The Reinterpretation of Ethnic Segmentation: Cultural Translation
The concept of cultural translation is based on the notion of literary interference, which is defined as "a relation(ship) between literatures, whereby" one "may become a source of direct or indirect loans for another" (Even-Zohar 1990: 54). "Literature" in this context signifies the totality of activities in a literary system, including all sources of 32. On the eve of the First World War, there were, in the Ottoman Empire, 500 French schools, with 59,414 students; 675 American ones, with 34,317 students; 178 British ones, with 12,800 students, and many other German, Italian, and Russian schools (Szyliowicz 1973: 149) . 33. Carter Findley (1980, 1982, 1989) , who has worked extensively on the issue of minority incorporation into the Ottoman polity, argues that historical conjuncture, namely, the frequent Balkan revolts and wars with the West, rendered such an incorporation impossible (Findley 1989: 34). social knowledge, such as the contexts of history, culture, language, and society. Interference becomes indirect when a source literature is intermediated through some channel, such as translation. By analogy, then, cultural translation refers to the mediation of meaning structures within and among social groups. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, Western conceptions of society and social behavior became the cultural source from which the Ottoman Muslims and minorities drew, and with which they redrew, their interpretations. Although some cultural translation occurred through the print media of newspapers and novels, Western knowledge reproduced within Westernstyle schools became its most significant medium. Cultural translation sets the boundaries of social behavior and controls the nature of political action; hence, acting within the new parameters created by such cultural translation, the Ottoman Muslims attempted to reform the state, while the minorities sought political autonomy.
Eighteenth-century Western social thought centered on the issues of legal equality and legal rights,34 liberty, self-determination, and the sovereignty of the people. The revolutions in North America and France demonstrated the social power of these issues and advanced a reexamination of social groups in terms of who the "people" were and what rights they should possess. Three particular kinds of legal rights were discussed in depth: (1) civil rights, such as personal liberty, including freedom of speech, opinion, and religion; the right to own property and to enter into binding contracts; and the right to justice; (2) political rights, such as enfranchisement and the right to seek and hold public office; and (3) social rights, ranging from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share fully in the social heritage and to attain a reasonable standard of living relative to one's society (Van Amersfoot 1978).
These rights gave new meaning to such words as "liberty," "equality," and "nationality" in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Lewis 1953: 107-8), and their subsequent translations into Ottoman similarly gave new meaning to such concepts as vatan (fatherland) and millet (nation). Both concepts acquired, as did many others, political significance extending beyond the religious and regional boundaries, and nineteenth-century Ottoman newspapers reflected the power of such cultural translations. Ottoman thinker, playwright, and poet Namik Kemal, who was the first to popularize the word "vatan" as a geographical term that implied an emotional bond, galvanized the Ottoman public around this term. He defined "vatan" as "a sacred idea resulting from the conglomeration of various noble feelings, such 34. The eradication of economic inequality became a central issue in Western social thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Schermerhorn 1970: 44). as the people, liberty, brotherhood, interest, sovereignty, respect for one's ancestors, love of the family, and childhood memories" (Mardin 1962: 326) . His Ottoman audience then evoked, and constructed, these feelings in their own social experiences.
The Ottoman Muslims also cultivated social behavior and practices based on Western models. Some medical students, for instance, had group photographs taken, with each of them holding a signboard bearing the words "liberty," "fraternity," and "equality" (Ali Kemal 1985 Kemal [1913 amples of Western ones, they were able to conceptualize a reformed Ottoman society.
The students often acquired significant social and cultural knowledge from their courses in Western science and technology. Ottoman medical students, for example, analyzed Ottoman societal processes by means of the science they learned, arguing that even though medical students, "as professional physicians, are requested not to extend their hand to the pulse of politics, [such a condition is impossible to keep]. If the nation becomes ill, to whom will it entrust its pulse? To the physicians, of course" (Hanioglu 1981: 22) . The educated students also assumed that, following Gustave Le Bon's suggestions, they would assume the intellectual leadership of Ottoman society in order to educate and rule the populace (ibid.: 162-63). After all, they said, both the elites and the masses needed guides like themselves to bring out their best qualities.
Western-style education also entailed the analysis of history and culture in terms of the separate origins (and perhaps the separate destinies) of different social groups. Hence, the Ottoman students could not avoid an assessment of where they stood in their respective contexts. The Ottoman religious minorities must therefore have become more conscious, through Western education, of their minority status, notably, their subordination, their limited access to social resources, and the structural imbalances in their relations with the Ottoman society at large. They were also probably made more aware of their "separateness," that is, their ethnic status, or their own shared culture, heritage, and identity as a social group. Western values thus assumed a politicized ethnic form in Ottoman society as the Ottoman minorities aspired to more legal rights. When state attempts to incorporate the minorities into the Ottoman polity failed, the minorities looked to their own communities for guidance and inspiration. They began demanding the right to self-determination in their relations with society at large, thus transforming themselves into ethnic groups, which could potentially extend beyond the Ottoman societal boundaries.
Political Outcomes: Autonomy, Independence, or Intervention? The Ottoman Muslims trained in state schools based on the Western model acquired new skills, formed networks with each other, and, most significantly, were exposed to new, alternative models by which society could be organized. They did not, as might have been expected from earlier palace-school experience, develop an overriding allegiance to the sultan who initiated this system of education.36 These 36. It is telling that the students of these Western-style schools were originally recruited from among the sons (some of them orphans) of soldiers and retired officials (Adivar 1970 (Adivar [1943 : 184) in order to foster such allegiance to the sultan.
Western-style schools fostered, among the Muslim students, allegiance to the ideas of social equality, liberty, and legal rights as well as to the abstract concept of the state. Personal allegiance to the sultan was therefore eclipsed by a patriotic allegiance to the Ottoman "state." In order to reorganize Ottoman polity around this new conception of the state, students began to form secret organizations, such as those of the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks. Most of their meetings were raided by the Ottoman security forces, and many were taken into custody or exiled (Hanioglu 1985: 177) . Nevertheless, this organized political challenge to the sultan from within the empire culminated in 1923 with the establishment of a Turkish republic, which irrevocably ended the sultan's rule over what was left of the Ottoman Empire.37
What kind of society did these secret organizations envision and how willing were they to incorporate the Ottoman minorities into their political enterprise? The image of Western science informed and legitimated the course of action taken by these organizations, as it made the roots of rebellion appear natural. Medical students studying chemistry argued, for example, that in "chemistry ... when two potent substances combine, they translate into valuable matter that contains all types of strong elements. Let us unite and a phenomenal force will result. Then let us attack. Let us demolish, with our own hands, the tower of despotism erected against us" (Hanioglu 1981: 12 ). Applying such scientific-sounding principles to their political activities should, in theory, have united all opposing "potent substances," including minority groups, against a common enemy. These organizations also drew upon their newly acquired Western knowledge when deciding how to mobilize in unison against the sultan. They followed the organizational guidelines of Western clandestine cells in forming their secret organizations and in discussing membership policies. For instance, the Union and Progress Committee (which eventually deposed the sultan) used the principles of Greek and Italian independence cells to structure their organization, whose founding members were all Ottoman Muslim medical students. However, the membership issue raised the question of minority participation, which the committee could not resolve. While some members, such as Ibrahim Temo, wished to include Ottoman minorities in the committee's membership, others argued against their inclusion. This ambivalence persisted throughout the history of the organization, and even after it had evolved into a political force in the empire, the committee still could not shake off the insufficient quota system that had been developed by the former Ottoman administration to assure some degree of minority participation in the Ottoman polity (Temo 1987 (Temo [1939 : 17). Ahmed Zuhdii Pasa's discomfiture with the exclusion of minorities from the state educational system, however, illuminates the very different way in which the Ottoman state conceptualized "autonomy." The Ottoman state regarded the religious communities of minorities as already enjoying "communal" autonomy since, after all, they had control over their own administrative, legal, and internal political matters. The only other autonomy-related cases, which pertained more to the Ottoman state and society at large, were "territorial." In these cases, autonomy was granted (Inalclk 1973) to such faraway provinces as Egypt, Baghdad, Abyssinia, and Basra and to the frontier provinces of Tripoli, Tunisia, and Algeria out of geographical necessity. The subject principalities, such as the Khanate of the Crimea and the Sherifate of Mecca, the hereditary chieftainships in some areas of eastern Anatolia under the control of Ottoman garrisons stationed nearby, and the Christian vassal principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia, Transylvania, Dubrovnik, Georgia, Circassia, and the Cossack hetmans were all likewise granted autonomy out of geographical necessity.
Ethnic divisions developed among
According to the Ottoman state's collective memory, the only demand by minorities for any other type of autonomy was that initiated by the Ottoman Greeks. Although they had initially demanded communal autonomy, this soon became a demand for "territorial" autonomy and ultimately led to the formation of an independent Greek state. Thus, the Ottoman state perceived all minority attempts to attain communal autonomy in this vein, that is, as demands for an actual territorial autonomy that would rapidly progress to political independence. This view of autonomy adopted by the Ottoman state became the most significant internal factor to polarize those Ottoman minorities whose political agendas did not already include territorial autonomy or political independence.
Ottoman ethnic segmentation was thus to reproduce itself through Western education and cultural translation, further polarizing Ottoman Muslims and minorities. Each group sought, within these parameters, a different future. For the Muslims, the future lay in reforming the Ottoman state, while for the minorities, it coalesced outside the boundaries of the Ottoman state.
Conclusion
Why, however, did only certain Ottoman minorities have successful independence movements? Why did the others fail? One can conjecture that this was primarily due to the structural transformation of the Ottoman state during the nineteenth century. The state and its minorities failed to establish a shared discourse on autonomy, which they perceived very differently. The failure of the Ottoman state to address the issue of communal autonomy, together with the increasing diffusion of nationalist ideologies from the West, soon polarized the Ottoman minorities in the Balkan provinces. The Ottoman state was unequipped to forestall these independence movements.
As the Ottoman administration became increasingly staffed by Muslims trained in Western-style schools, the structure of the Ottoman state began to change. These Western-educated officials tried to remodel the Ottoman state along Western lines of political and economic centralization, a policy that was not congenial to autonomous provinces. In order to achieve this centralization while also containing the minorities within the empire's boundaries, these officials attempted to actively break down the existing segmentation. This could perhaps account for the Armenian movement's failure to win autonomy. Since the Turkish Muslims had solidified their rule at the sultan's expense by the end of the nineteenth century, the Armenians were, in effect, faced with a new, structurally changed and solidified Ottoman state.
In conclusion, then, the study of the nineteenth-century Ottoman transformation illustrates the significance of ethnicity to the process of social transformation. The concept of ethnicity in nineteenth-century Ottoman society has been problematized here and its redefinition under the influence of Ottoman structural and cultural divisions and Western-style education has been demonstrated. The term "ethnic segmentation" has been used to describe the polarization of Ottoman society as a consequence of this redefinition, illustrating how the Ottoman Muslims and minorities both sought the same political ends (autonomy and participation), but achieved different political outcomes as a result of ethnic segmentation and the disparate cultural translations that it produced. Ottoman religious minorities were polarized and thus sought political independence, while the Muslims set about (and succeeded in) transforming the Ottoman Empire into a republic.
